BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Elevating Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine of Substantive Due Process by Nguyen, Son B.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 1 Article 8
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Elevating
Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine
of Substantive Due Process
Son B. Nguyen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Son B. Nguyen, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Elevating Reasonableness in Punitive Damages to a Doctrine of Substantive Due
Process, 57 Md. L. Rev. 251 (1998)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/8
Note
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. GORE:
ELEVATING REASONABLENESS IN PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO A DOCTRINE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,' the United States Supreme
Court considered whether a $2 million punitive-damages award
against an automobile distributor for failing to disclose the presale
repainting of a new car was so grossly excessive as to exceed constitu-
tional limits. 2 The Court answered affirmatively, holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' imposes a substantive
limit on the size of punitive damages.4 The Court reached this con-
clusion by reasoning that under due process, a tortfeasor is entitled to
both fair notice of the magnitude of the punishment and adequate
safeguards against arbitrary decisions.5 In so ruling, the Court has ele-
vated reasonableness in civil penalties to a doctrine of substantive due
process, thereby extending recent Supreme Court precedent.6 More-
over, the Court has provided specific, practical guidelines for scruti-
nizing punitive damages.
I. THE CASE
In January 1990, German Auto, Inc., an automobile dealer in Bir-
mingham, Alabama, sold a black BMW sports sedan to Dr. Ira Gore,
Jr. (Gore) for $40,750.88. 7 At that time, BMW of North America
(BMW NA), the American distributor, had adopted a nationwide pol-
icy of not disclosing to its dealers and customers any presale repairs to
1. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), rev'g 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 1592-93.
3. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No state shall
• . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. BMW 116 S. Ct. at 1592, 1604.
5. Id. at 1598.
6. See id. at 1614 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (disapproving "[the Court's] elevation of 'fair-
ness' in punishment to a principle of 'substantive due process'"); see also infra Part IV (dis-
cussing extension of precedent).
7. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
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new cars if the cost of repairs did not exceed three percent' of the
car's suggested retail price.9 BMW NA did not reveal that Gore's auto-
mobile had been repainted, because the cost of repainting the auto-
mobile was $601.37, less than three percent of the retail price."0 Gore
learned that the car "had been partially refinished" when he took his
car to Slick Finish, a detailing shop, "to make the car look 'snazzier
than it normally would appear.""'  Gore then sued German Auto,
BMW NA, and the manufacturer, Bayerische Motoren Werke, Aktien-
gesellschaft (BMW AG). 2 Gore's suit alleged, inter alia, that the fail-
ure to disclose the presale repainting "constituted suppression of a
material fact.' 1 3 At trial, Gore presented evidence that the refinishing
devalued his car by $4000 and that, since 1983, BMW NA had sold 983
similarly repainted automobiles as new in the United States without
disclosing the repainting.14
The jury returned a verdict for Gore, awarding him $4000
in compensatory damages.' 5  Moreover, after determining that the
BMW defendants "had been guilty of gross, malicious, intentional,
and wanton fraud," the jury added $4 million in punitive damages
against the defendants jointly. 6 The trial court reviewed the jury
verdict under existing precedent 17 and entered a judgment on the
8. This three percent standard was in compliance with the most stringent of the dis-
closure statutes in 25 states. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594; see also infra note 27 and accompany-
ing text.
9. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
10. Id. The parties assumed that acid rain had damaged the exterior paint of Gore's
car during the trip from Germany to North America. Id. at 1593 n.1. The distributor
repainted "[t]he top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of Dr. Gore's car ... at BMW's
vehicle preparation center in Brunswick, Georgia." Id.
11. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 621. Although Gore's car had been repainted, the car had no
flaws in its appearance during the months preceding the lawsuit, and there was no noticea-
ble exterior damage. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
12. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 622.
13. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. Alabama law provides: "Suppression of a material fact
which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation
to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the partic-
ular circumstances of the case." ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993).
14. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
15. Id.
16. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 622. During summation at trial, Gore's counsel suggested that
punitive damages against BMW NA should be calculated by multiplying the total number
of nationwide sales of repainted BMW cars by the amount of compensatory damages.
BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. Apparently, the jury followed this suggestion in computing the $4
million punitive-damages award. Id. at 1615-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
17. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 622. The court applied the "Green Oil"factors, which include:
(1) whether the punitive-damages award reasonably relates to the actual harm; (2) the
"degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct; (3) the profit derived from the
misconduct; (4) the defendant's financial position; (5) whether inclusion of the costs of
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verdict.1 8 The court denied the defendants' motions to- set aside the
verdict. t9 BMW NA and BMW AG appealed.2 °
On appeal, in a per curiam opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court
first found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over BMW AG.2 1 BMW
AG argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because BMW AG was a
"foreign corporation" which had neither a direct relationship with
BMW NA nor sufficient contacts with Alabama.2 2 Also, BMW AG
pointed out that Gore's automobile had been in BMW NA's posses-
sion before any refinishing was done.23 The Alabama Supreme Court
found these arguments persuasive and reversed the trial court's judg-
ment with respect to BMW AG, thereby releasing the manufacturer
from liability.
24
Second, the court rejected BMW NA's contention that Gore had
failed to present evidence sufficient to show under Alabama law that
the distributor "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression,
fraud, wantonness or malice with regard to [Gore] ."25 BMW NA ar-
gued that it had acted in "a good faith belief' that the refinished vehi-
cles would not depreciate in value.26 Also, BMW NA asserted that its
policy of not disclosing minor repairs was "customary in the automo-
bile manufacturing industry" and that it had adopted the three-per-
cent standard to comply with various consumer protection laws which
defined the types of damage to a new car that require disclosure.27
litigation would encourage plaintiffs to vindicate their rights; (6) whether criminal sanc-
tions have been imposed on the defendant for his misconduct (as a mitigation factor); and
(7) whether there have been other civil actions against the same defendant for the same
misconduct (as a mitigation factor). Id. at 624 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)). Based on the analysis of these factors, the trial court concluded:
(1) BMW's conduct was "reprehensible"; (2) the nondisclosure policy was profitable to
BMW; (3) the judgment "would not have a substantial impact upon [BMW's] financial
position"; (4) the litigation had been expensive; and (5) the punitive award reasonably
related to the actual and potential harm. I. at 625-27.







25. Id. at 622-23.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 623. BMW NA introduced evidence that its nondisclosure policy was consis-
tent with the disclosure statutes of 25 other states. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594. The strictest of
these statutes mandated disclosure of presale repairs costing more than three percent of
the suggested retail price. Id. The remaining statutes did not require disclosure of less
costly repairs. Id.
Arizona, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia require written disclosure of
presale repairs costing more than three percent of the suggested retail price. ARiz. REv.
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The court found these arguments unconvincing, reasoning that, at
the time BMW NA adopted its nondisclosure policy, Alabama did not
have any statute allowing nondisclosure if repairs were below three
percent of the automobile's suggested retail price.28
Third, the court rejected BMW NA's claim that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of BMW NA's sales of refinished cars in
other states.29 BMW NA contended that only fourteen of the 983
automobiles sold in the United States had been sold in Alabama and
that there was no evidence that the out-of-state sales were fraudu-
lent."0 The court found this argument unpersuasive as well, reasoning
that although BMW NA's out-of-state conduct might not have been
fraudulent under the laws of other states, the trial court did not err in
STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.03 (West 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305.1 (d) (5a) (1996); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-32-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1571(D) (Michie Supp.
1997). Alabama, California, and Oklahoma mandate disclosure when the cost of repairs
exceeds three percent or $500, whichever is greater. ALA. CODE § 8-19-5(22)(c) (1993);
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 9990-9991 (West Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1112.1 (West
Supp. 1997). Indiana mandates a four-percent disclosure policy. IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-23-44, 9-23-4-5 (Michie 1997). Minnesota requires disclosure of repairs costing more
than four percent of suggested retail price or $500, whichever is greater. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325F.664 (West 1995). New York requires disclosure when the cost of repairs exceeds
five percent of the suggested retail price. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396-p(5) (a), (d) (McKin-
ney 1996). Vermont sets a five-percent disclosure threshold for the first $10,000 in repair
costs and two percent thereafter. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4087(d) (1993). Arkansas, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming require disclosure of repairs costing more than six percent of retail value.
Asx. CODE ANN. § 23-112-705 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 49-1624 (1994); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 710/5 (West Supp. 1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 190.0491(5) (Banks-Baldwin
Supp. 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:1260 (West Supp. 1996); Miss. MOTOR VEHICLE
COMM'N, REGuLATION No. 1 (1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-C:5(III) (d) (1995); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4517.61 (Anderson 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-5.1-18(d), (f) (1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 218.01(2d)(a) (West 1994); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-115 (Michie 1997). Iowa
and North Dakota mandate disclosure of repairs costing $3000 or more. IowA CODE ANN.
§ 321.69 (West Supp. 1997); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 37-09-01-01 (1992). Georgia requires
disclosure of paint damage that costs more than $500 to repair. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 40-1-5(b)-(c) (1997) (enacted after Gore purchased his car). Florida requires dealers to
disclose paint repair which costs more than $100 and of which they have actual knowledge.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.27(9) (n) (West Supp. 1997). Oregon requires manufacturers to dis-
close all "post-manufacturing" damage and repairs. OR. REv. STAT. § 650.155 (Supp.
1994).
Many of these state statutes exclude from the calculation of repair costs the value of
items such as glass, tires, wheels and bumpers if they are replaced with identical or compa-
rable manufacturer's original equipment. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 9990-9991 (West
Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-5(b)-(e) (1997); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 710/5
(West Supp. 1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 190.0491(5) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. it. 47, § 1112.1 (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1571(D) (Michie
Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4087(d) (1993).
28. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 623.
29. Id. at 623-24.
30. Id. at 623.
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admitting the evidence of out-of-state sales because the evidence
showed a pattern of conduct.
3
'
Fourth, and most important regarding BMW NA's claim that the
punitive-damages award was constitutionally excessive in light of Ala-
bama's precedent,32 the court found that even though the evidence
sustained the award of punitive damages, the jury had improperly
used the out-of-state sales as a multiplier for the $4000 compensatory
damages. 3' The court reasoned that while evidence of the out-of-state
sales was admissible as to the issue of a "pattern and practice" of BMW
NA's acts, Gore did not present any evidence showing in which states
the defendant's conduct was wrongful. 4 Therefore, the jury should
not have used the out-of-state sales to calculate the award.35 Accord-
ingly, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against
BMW NA, but remitted the award to $2 million.36 BMW NA then ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether
the punitive-damages award was constitutionally excessive.37
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the BMWdecision, the issue of whether unfair civil
penalties would violate due process was not a new concern. Earlier in
this century, the United States Supreme Court had addressed the va-
lidity of civil penalties awarded pursuant to a statutory scheme. 8 The
31. Id at 623-24, 627.
32. Id, at 624-29. BMW NA pointed out that it had previously been sued by another
plaintiff in an analogous case. Id, at 626. In Yates v. BMW of North America, Inc., the jury
awarded a similar amount of compensatory damages, but it did not award any punitive
damages. 642 So. 2d 937, 937-40 (Ala. 1993). The Alabama Supreme Court viewed the
disparity between Yates and BMW"as a reflection of the inherent uncertainty of the trial
process and a result of the fact that the cases were tried differently to different juries and at
different times." BMW, 646 So. 2d at 626.
33. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 627; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 623-29.
35. Id.
36. Id, at 629.
37. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595.
38. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment placed "outer limits" on
civil penalties authorized by statutes. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 276 (1989) (citation omitted). The Court, however, had not addressed the ques-
tion "whether due process act[ed] as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit." Id at 277 (citing Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988)).
In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351 (1913), the Court held that a
$500 statutory penalty, in the form of liquidated damages against a common carrier for
overcharging passengers $3.02, was "grossly" disproportionate to the actual damages and
"so arbitrary and oppressive" that enforcement of the penalty would violate the Due Proc-
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Court, however, has only recently addressed the constitutionality of
large punitive damages awarded by a jury. 9 In the past decade, the
Court has repeatedly struggled to determine a feasible approach for
identifying excessive punitive damages.
This struggle started in 1989, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.4" The jury, after finding Browning-Ferris in violation of
federal antitrust law and Vermont tort law, awarded Kelco Disposal
$51,146 in actual damages and $6 million in punitive damages. 41
Browning-Ferris asserted that the punitive award violated the Exces-
sive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, federal common law, and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The 7-2 ma-
jority affirmed the award, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment does not apply to awards of punitive damages
in civil cases between private parties "when the government neither
has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
damages awarded."43 The Court also held that federal common law
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 485-91 (1915) (holding that a $6300 penalty imposed on a tele-
phone company pursuant to a statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it was "so
plainly arbitrary and oppressive" in light of the circumstances surrounding the telephone
company's statutory violation). But see St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams,
251 U.S. 63, 64-67 (1919) (upholding a statutory scheme authorizing penalties ranging
from $50 to $300 that passengers could recover from common carrier for overcharges).
39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor noted that "[a]wards
of punitive damages are skyrocketing." Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). She explained, "As recently as a decade ago, the
largest award.., was $250,000 ... [and now] awards more than 30 times as high have been
sustained on appeal . . . [such as] $10 million . . . $8 million . . . [and] $6.2 million." Id,
(citations omitted).
40. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
41. Id at 259-62. Browning-Ferris operated a nationwide waste-disposal business. Id at
260. It attempted to monopolize a local market by driving its competitor, Kelco Disposal,
out of business. Id Browning-Ferris ordered its managers to "[p]ut [Kelco] out of busi-
ness. Do whatever it takes. Squish [Kelco] like a bug." Id During this "predatory cam-
paign," Browning-Ferris also instructed its salespersons "that if 'it meant give the stuff away,
give it away.'" Id at 261.
The trial court instructed the jury that punitive damages against Browning-Ferris
could be awarded if the jury found by "clear and convincing evidence" that the conduct of
Browning-Ferris "revealed actual malice ... or constituted a willful and wanton or reckless
disregard of [Kelco's] rights." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court also
instructed that the jury could consider "the character of [Browning-Ferris], [its] financial
standing, and the nature of [its] acts." Id. at 261-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. I& at 264-80 (detailing the history and application of the Eighth Amendment); see
also infra note 43 and accompanying text. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
43. Id at 260, 264. The Court reasoned that, based on the history and language of the
Constitution, the Eighth Amendment addressed bails, fines, and punishments, which had
been interpreted as applicable primarily, if not exclusively, to criminal cases. Id. at 262.
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did not apply to Browning-Ferris, because the issue of unfairness in pu-
nitive damages had been addressed by state common law.4' Regard-
ing the petitioner's due process claim, the Court hinted in dictum
that Supreme Court precedent contained "some authority... for the
view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a
civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme."4" The
Court observed, however, that it had not yet considered whether, ab-
sent any statutory limit, due process imposed an independent limit on
jury discretion to award punitive damages.46 Noting that Browning-
Ferris had neither raised its due process argument before the courts
below nor mentioned the argument in the petition for certiorari, the
Court unanimously concluded that "[the due process] inquiry must
await another day."
4 7
Two years later, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,48 the
Court remarked that "the Fourteenth Amendment due process chal-
lenge [to a punitive-damages award] is here once again."49 In Haslip,
the Court affirmed a $1.04 million award of punitive damages against
the petitioner, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, for fraud com-
mitted by Pacific Mutual's agent.5° Pacific Mutual contended that the
punitive award violated due process because it was "the product of
unbridled jury discretion" and flawed procedures.51 The Court re-
jected this contention, finding that the challenged common-law
method for assessing punitive damages was not "so inherently unfair"
as to violate due process and that the procedures by which the award
The Court, however, cautioned that this interpretation was limited in that the Court did
not need to go "so far as to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies just to criminal
cases" in order to resolve the case before the Court. Id at 263 & n.3.
44. Id. at 277-80. The Court simply stated that its review of the punitive award was
limited because there was no applicable federal common law standard; the subject of an
award's excessiveness based on proportionality between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages had been one of state common law. Id. at 279; see also supra note 38.
45. Browning-Ferns, 492 U.S. at 276 (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v.
Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)).
46. Id. at 277; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 277. Although the unanimous Court left open the Four-
teenth Amendment due process issue because the petitioner had not properly preserved it
for appeal, in two separate opinions, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor
indicated that due process may impose procedural and substantive constraints on punitive-
damages awards. See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
48. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 6-8, 24. The agent defrauded clients by misappropriating their premium pay-
ments for personal use. Id. at 5. As a result, a client's medical bill of about $3000 went
unpaid. Id at 5-7.
51. Id. at 7-8.
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had been made "impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful
constraint" on jury discretion.5 2 While insisting that punitive-damages
awards could violate due process absent procedural safeguards, the
Haslip Court provided little guidance for determining when that viola-
tion would occur.53 The Court simply concluded that the punitive
damages against Pacific Mutual did not violate the Due Process Clause
because Pacific Mutual "had the benefit of the full panoply of...
procedural protections."54 Ultimately, the Court refused to specify
the factors for scrutinizing similarly large awards.55
In 1993, with ambiguous precedent, the Court continued to
struggle with the constitutionality of excessive punitive damages in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.56 In TXO, a jury found
the petitioner, TXO Production Corporation, liable for slander of ti-
tle57 and awarded the respondent, Alliance Resources Corporation,
$19 thousand in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive
damages.5" TXO asserted, inter alia, that the award was excessive and
that the procedures by which the award had been made were unfair.59
In a plurality opinion, the Court affirmed the punitive award, which
was 526 times the compensatory damages. 60 However, in spite of the
52. Id. at 17, 19-24. These procedures are also known as the Green Oil factors, which
the Alabama Supreme Court later applied in reviewing the $2 million punitive-damages
award against BMW NA. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
53. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 12-24.
54. See -id. at 19, 23. These protections include: (1) proper instructions to the jury
regarding the purpose of punishment; (2) availability of post-trial procedures for a court to
follow and specific factors to consider in scrutinizing punitive awards; (3) the trial court's
power to reduce awards where appropriate; and (4) availability of appellate review. Id. at
19-24.
55. See id. at 19-24.
56. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 450-51. TXO planned to purchase from Alliance some tracts of land under
which geologists had discovered oil and gas. Id. at 447. Previously, a predecessor in inter-
est of Alliance had conveyed the mineral rights in the same land to another party, Leo J.
Signaigo, Jr., but had reserved the interests in oil and gas development to Alliance. Id. at
448. Signaigo, in turn, conveyed the mineral rights to other parties. Id In an attempt to
gain substantial leverage during a negotiation with Alliance to purchase the land, TXO
intentionally clouded Alliance's title to the land by purchasing the mineral rights from
Signaigo's successors in interest and claiming falsely that Alliance did not have clear title
because Signaigo's successors in interest also shared the oil and gas interests. Id. at 449-52.
Thus, even though TXO knew that Alliance had clear title to the oil and gas rights, TXO
fraudulently set up the scheme in an effort to reduce the royalty payments to Alliance and
to increase TXO's interests in the oil and gas rights. Id.
58. Id. at 446.
59. Id. at 453-55, 462-63.
60. Id. at 453, 466.
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parties' encouragement, the Court provided no further guidelines for
identifying unreasonably excessive punitive damages.61
TXO urged the Court to apply "heightened scrutiny" in reviewing
punitive damages; Alliance, by contrast, encouraged the Court to con-
duct a rational basis review.62 The plurality rejected both approaches,
reasoning that although heightened scrutiny would be unnecessary
because of the safeguards inherent in the jury system, 63 a rational ba-
sis review would essentially give juries and judges a blank check to
make large punitive awards.' Unable to agree on a single approach,
the Justices declined to announce a "test" for determining when puni-
tive awards are grossly excessive. 65 Consequently, while maintaining
that some punitive awards could violate due process either because of
their size or the procedures by which they were made, the TXO Court
perpetuated the uncertainty by not confronting the matter squarely.66
Refusing to "'draw a mathematical bright line,"' the Court stated
vaguely that, in reviewing the size of a punitive award, a "'general
[concern] of reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into the constitu-
tional calculus.' "67
Another turning point in the development of procedural due
process relating to punitive damages came in 1994, when the Court
again attempted to clarify the punitive-damages controversy in Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg.61 In Oberg, a jury found the petitioner, Honda Mo-
tor Company, liable for manufacturing a defective three-wheeled all-
61. Id. at 453-66. The Court justified the 526:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory dam-
ages by comparing the $10 million verdict to TXO's potential profit of $5 to $8 million had
the fraudulent scheme succeeded. Id. at 459, 462. Justice O'Connor dissented, opining
that the $10 million verdict was a "monstrous award" and that more specific constraints on
a jury's ability to award punitive damages need to be developed. Id. at 473-75, 489-90, 496-
98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. TXO, 509 U.S. at 456.
63. Id. The Court noted that the jury process itself contained the following safeguards:
(1) minimization of bias through the screening ofjury members before trial; (2) the jury's
"collective deliberation" in reaching a verdict after it had evaluated the available evidence
and the parties' adversarial arguments; (3) the trial judge's subsequent review and affirm-
ance of the verdict; and (4) appellate review. Id, at 456-57. Based on this rationale, the
Court concluded that "a judgment that is a product of [fair procedures] is entitled to a
strong presumption of validity." Id at 457.
64. Id, at 456.
65. Id. at 456-66.
66. See id at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality for failing to
confront squarely the issue of excessiveness of punitive-damages awards and for not de-
lineating clearer guidelines); see also id at 473-74, 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same
criticism).
67. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18
(1991)) (second alteration in original).
68. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
1998]
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terrain vehicle and awarded the respondent $919,390 in compensa-
tory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.69 Honda claimed
that the punitive award was "excessive" and that "Oregon courts
lacked the power to correct excessive verdicts."7' Finding that Ore-
gon's judicial process lacked sufficient "traditional procedures," the
Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's affirmance of the puni-
tive-damages award.7 1 The Court held that an amendment to the Ore-
gon Constitution prohibiting appellate review of the amount of
punitive damages awarded by a jury was inconsistent with the Due
Process Clause and was thus unconstitutional.7v In so holding, the
Court imposed stricter procedural controls on jury discretion and re-
versed its trend of affirming large awards of punitive damages. None-
theless, because the Oberg Court based its ruling on procedural
grounds, the question of whether due process imposed a substantive
limit on the size of punitive damages remained unanswered.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages.73
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyerjoined, began his analysis by
focusing on the relationship between Alabama's interests in punish-
69. Id at 418.
70. Id.
71. Id at 421,435. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that Oregon's lack of
appellate review of punitive-damages awards was "[a] departure from traditional proce-
dures" that had been an essential part of the American judicial process. Id. at 421. How-
ever, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, opined
that Oregon's procedures were not inconsistent with the Court's precedent on due proc-
ess. Id. at 436-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, she pointed out the following
procedural safeguards existing in Oregon's system: (1) the plaintiff was permitted to re-
cover no more than the amounts specified in the complaint; (2) the plaintiff was not al-
lowed to introduce evidence regarding defendant's wealth until a prima facie claim of
punitive damages had been shown; (3) the plaintiff must prove by "clear and convincing"
evidence that defendant was liable; and (4) the court must review a punitive award based
on seven substantive criteria, including the seriousness and frequency of defendant's con-
duct, defendant's profit from the conduct, and defendant's financial condition. Id
72. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432. The relevant amendment to the Oregon Constitution states:
In actions at.law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be other-
wise re-examined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively say
there is no evidence to support the verdict.
OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
73. 116 S. Ct. at 1592, 1604.
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ment and deterrence and the size of the punitive-damages award. 4
Justice Stevens noted that under the federal system Alabama, like the
other states, has "considerable flexibility in determining the level of
punitive damages that [it] will allow in [various cases]." However,
while Alabama could compel BMW NA to comply with a particular
disclosure policy in that state, Alabama could not punish BMW NA for
out-of-state conduct that was neither unlawful nor detrimental to Ala-
bama's residents. 76 Thus, to preserve the states' autonomy, Alabama
may not impose penalties "with the intent of changing the tortfeasors'
lawful conduct in other States." 77 Applying this state-interest analysis,
the Court concluded that the $2 million punitive award was "grossly
excessive" in relation to Alabama's legitimate objectives.78
Next, the Court observed that "[e] lementary notions of fairness"
dictated that a tortfeasor be given "fair notice not only of the conduct
that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the pen-
alty that a State may impose."'79 The Court developed three "guide-
posts" for determining whether adequate notice has been given: (1)
the "degree of reprehensibility" of defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio
between the actual or potential harm and the punitive damages; and
74. Id at 1595.
75. Id
76. Id at 1597. The Court found that BMW NA had attempted in good faith to comply
with a "patchwork" of confusing and disparate state consumer protection laws, and thus
BMW NA should not be punished so severely for misconduct in Alabama that is lawful in
other states. Id. at 1594, 1596-98; see also supra note 27 (listing disclosure statutes in various
states). This is true especially because Gore failed to present any evidence at trial to show
that BMW NA's nondisclosure policy was unlawful in other states. BM, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
Gore contended, however, that although BMW NA relied on its interpretation of the state
disclosure statutes, these statutes "supplement, rather than supplant, existing remedies for
breach of contract and common-law fraud." Id. at 1600. Thus, Gore argued, "the statutes
may not properly be viewed as immunizing from liability [BMW NA's] nondisclosure of
repairs costing less than the applicable statutory threshold." Id Gore also asserted that
BMW NA "should have anticipated that its failure to disclose similar repair work could
expose it to liability for fraud." Id The Court rejected Gore's arguments after a review of
the applicable statutes, pointing out that, because the states had not explicitly addressed
whether their disclosure statutes supplement common-law duties, corporations "could rea-
sonably interpret the disclosure requirements as establishing safe harbors." Id
77. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1597.
78. Id at 1598. The Court also noted:
The Alabama Supreme Court has held that a car may be considered "new" as a
matter of law even if its finish contains minor cosmetic flaws. We note also that at
trial respondent [Gore] only introduced evidence of undisclosed paint damage to
new cars repaired at a cost of $300 or more. This decision suggests that respon-
dent believed that the jury might consider some repairs too de minimis to warrant
disclosure.
Id at 1601 n.30 (citation omitted).
79. Id at 1598.
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(3) the authorized civil or criminal sanctions for comparable
misconduct.80
Using the guideposts, the Court made three key findings. First,
because BMW NA's conduct "evinced no indifference to or reckless
disregard for the health and safety of others," and because the harm
that Gore suffered was "purely economic in nature," BMW NA's con-
duct was not "sufficiently reprehensible" to justify the $2 million
award."1 Second, the punitive damages were 500 times the actual
damages as determined by the jury, and there was no reasonable rela-
tionship between these two types of awards.8 2 Third, the $2 million
award was dramatically greater than the maximum $2000 civil penalty
authorized by Alabama for a violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.8 3 Furthermore, there was no judicial precedent in which simi-
larly large punitive damages were awarded for comparable miscon-
duct when BMW NA's nondisclosure policy was first challenged. 4
Because none of the Alabama statutes provided "fair notice" that
BMW NA's misconduct might "subject [BMW NA] to a multimillion
dollar penalty," and because there was no judicial decision in Alabama
or elsewhere indicating that BMW NA's misconduct might give rise to
such a severe punishment, the Court concluded that "[t]he sanction
imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it was
necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less
drastic remedies could be expected to achieve that goal." 5 Upon
these findings, the 5-4 majority held that, because BMW NA had not
80. Id. at 1598-99.
81. Id. at 1599. The Court pointed out that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others .... '[N]onviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the
threat of violence.' Similarly, 'trickery and deceit' are more reprehensible than negli-
gence. [This principle derives from the notion that] punitive damages may not be 'grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the offense.'" Id (citations omitted). The Court then
concluded that in BMW "none of the aggravating factors associated with reprehensible
conduct [was] present." Id. Namely, "[t]he presale refinishing of [Gore's] car had no
effect on its performance or safety features, or even its appearance for at least nine months
after his purchase." Id. The Court warned, however, that injury which is only economic in
nature is not always a mitigating factor. Id. That is, in some cases, "infliction of economic
injury, especially when done intentionally through affirmative acts of misconduct or when
the target is financially vulnerable, can warrant a substantial penalty." Id. (citation omit-
ted). However, "this observation does not convert all acts that cause economic harm into
torts that are sufficiently reprehensible to justify a significant sanction in addition to com-
pensatory damages." Id.
82. Id. at 1602.
83. ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1993) (imposing a maximum of $2000 on deceptive trade
practices); see also BM, 116 S. Ct. at 1603. The Court did not address the issue of criminal
sanctions.
84. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603-04.
85. Id. at 1603.
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received sufficient notice that its conduct would be subjected to a se-
vere civil penalty,86 the $2 million punitive-damages award was consti-
tutionally unreasonable.8 7 The Court then reversed the judgment of
the Alabama Supreme Court and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.8
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Jus-
tices O'Connor and Souter, noted that ordinarily a judgment which
was a product of "fair procedures" would be entitled to "a strong pre-
sumption of validity." 9 He concluded, however, that in this case the
presumption was overcome.9 ° He based this conclusion on two key
factors: (1) the judgment against BMW NA was "the product of a sys-
tem of standards that did not significantly constrain a court's, and
hence ajury's, discretion in making [the punitive] award," and (2) the
award "was grossly excessive in light of the State's legitimate punitive
damages objectives."'"
86. Id. at 1604; see also id, at 1604-09 (Breyer, J., concurring).
87. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
88. Id. On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court re-applied the Green Oil factors in
light of the three "guideposts" established by the BMW Court and concluded "that the $2
million award of punitive damages against BMW was grossly excessive." BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, No. 1920324, 1997 WL 233910, at *8-9 (Ala. May 9, 1997) (per curiam). The
court then affirmed the trial court's order denying BMW NA's motion for a new trial "on
the condition that [Gore] file with (the Alabama Supreme Court] within 21 days a remitti-
tar of damages to the sum of $50,000." Id. at *9. If Gore chose to contest the ruling, the
trial court's judgment would be reversed and Gore's case remanded for a new trial. IC.
It appears that the Alabama Supreme Court arrived at the $50,000 figure by taking the
number of the BMW NA's sales of refinished cars in Alabama (14) as an approximate
multiplier for the $4000 devaluation of Gore's repainted car. Id. at *10 (Cook, J., concur-
ring specially). The Alabama court seems to have adopted the approach that the United
States Supreme Court suggested in BMW.
In light of the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that (1) the jury had com-
puted its award by multiplying $4,000 by the number of refinished vehicles sold in
the United States and (2) that the award should have been based on Alabama
conduct, respect for the error-free portion of the jury verdict would seem to pro-
duce an award of $56,000 ($4,000 multiplied by 14, the number of repainted
vehicles sold in Alabama).
BMAW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595 n.11.
89. BMW, 116 U.S. at 1604 (Breyer,J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id
91. I. at 1609. Justice Breyer focused on the following findings in his concurrence.
First, Alabama's statute was broad and lacked "a standard that readily distinguishes be-
tween conduct warranting very small, and conduct warranting very large, punitive damages
awards." Id. at 1605. Second, the Alabama courts misapplied the Green Oil "'factors' in-
tended to constrain punitive damages awards." Id. at 1606 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Horn-
sby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989)). Third, the Alabama courts "neither referred to, nor made
any effort to find, nor enunciated any other standard, that either directly, or indirectly as
background, might have supplied the constraining legal force that the [Alabama] statute
and Green Oil standards (as interpreted here) lack." Id at 1607. Fourth, the $2 million
punitive-damages award was extraordinarily large in light of historical standards. Id at
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IV. ANALYSIS
The BMWCourt has elevated reasonableness in punitive damages
to a doctrine of substantive due process in two respects. First, the
Court has extended its recent precedent by holding that the Due
Process Clause imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive dam-
ages.92 In cases prior to BMW, the Court addressed primarily proce-
dural limits, such as jury instructions and appellate procedures.9"
BMWis the first case in which the Court has confronted squarely the
issue of substantive limits on punitive damages. Second, the Court has
provided a specific, practical framework for determining whether a
punitive-damages award exceeds its constitutional limit.94 By adding a
constitutional dimension to the reasonableness standard and provid-
ing a coherent framework for analysis, the Court has imposed addi-
tional necessary constraints on jury discretion to award punitive
damages.
A. The Relationship Between Reasonableness and Substantive Due Process
The BMW Court declared that when a punitive-damages award is
unreasonably large in relation to a state's legitimate interests in pun-
ishment and deterrence, the award "enter[s] the zone of arbitrariness
that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."95 In so declaring, the majority emphasized a close relationship
between reasonableness in punitive damages and substantive due
process. In a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter, Justice Breyer similarly underscored this relationship by stat-
ing that, when a punitive award is "'grossly excessive"' in relation to its
valid objectives, enforcement of the award is "an arbitrary deprivation
of... property in violation of the Due Process Clause."96 The major-
1608. Finally, the Alabama legislature did not enact any legislation to "impose quantitative
limits that would significantly [restrain] the fairly unbounded discretion created by the
absence of constraining legal standards." I&
92. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1592, 1604.
93. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (reviewing appellate pro-
cedures); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality
opinion) (determining whether the procedures by which the punitive-damages award had
been made were unfair); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (addressing
the validity of jury instructions).
94. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598-1604.
95. Id. at 1595.
96. Id. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) (plurality opinion) (stating, in dictum, that a
"grossly excessive" punitive award amounts to "a deprivation of property without due proc-
ess of law")).
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ity's and concurrence's equation of "reasonableness" with "substantive
due process" is proper for two reasons.
First, the equation enables the Court to define effectively the
outer limits on punitive damages by emphasizing the significance of
fairness in civil punishment. 7 Prior to BMW, the Court had indicated
that the Due Process Clause imposed outer limits on punitive-damages
awards. In Haslip, for example, although the Court held that the ver-
dict in that case did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety," it suggested that a four-to-one ratio of punitive to com-
pensatory damages was "close to the line.""8 Likewise, in Oberg, while
the Court did not address the issue of substantive due process as a
constraint on punitive awards, it did note that the Due Process Clause
"imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards." 9
The Court insisted but never actually held that enforcement of unrea-
sonably large punitive damages would violate due process.100 The
unique facts in BMW presented the Court with an opportunity to es-
tablish a doctrine that it had previously embraced. In light of the
Court's dicta, the holding in BMW is a logical extension of recent
Supreme Court precedent. If the goal now is to curb punitive dam-
ages nationwide, it is appropriate to underscore the importance of
fairness in civil penalties by raising the reasonableness inquiry to one
of constitutional scrutiny.
Second, the equation of reasonableness with substantive due
process ensures that similarly situated tortfeasors, regardless of their
identity, receive "uniform general treatment."10 1 As BMW illustrates,
97. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595-98.
98. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18, 23-24.
99. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994).
100. Id- See, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 462-66 (affirming a punitive-damages award on the
ground that the state court's judgment was a result of fair common law and procedures);
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17, 19-24 (approving state common-law method for assessing punitive
damages); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277-80 (1989)
(holding that state common-law method adequately addressed the fairness issue in puni-
tive damages). See also supra notes 44 (discussing court's review of punitive-damages
award), 52 (discussing Green Oil standards), and 63 (discussing the presumptions of validity
due to safeguards in the jury process).
101. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605 (Breyer,J., concurring) ("Requiring the application of law,
rather than a decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens notice of
what actions may subject them to punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform general
treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself."); see also Dorsey D.
Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REv. 975, 989 (1989) (stating
a "concern . . . that similarly situated persons will be treated unequally, and capricious
decisions will result"); cf Dick Thornburgh, America's Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospects for
Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074 (1996) (advocating uniform federal law for correcting the
problems in our current civil justice system).
1998]
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wrongdoers in different states might be punished unequally for simi-
lar misconduct, because the states might determine what was "reason-
able" based on disparate state law rather than on federal due process
law as interpreted by the Court.1 1 2 Thus, in BMW, the Alabama court
imposed $2 million in punitive damages on BMW NA for violating a
broadly defined statute which, as Justice Breyer observed, "author-
ize [d] punitive damages for the most serious kinds of misrepresenta-
tions, [such as] tricking the elderly out of their life savings, for much
less serious conduct, such as the failure to disclose repainting a car, at
issue [in BMW], and for a vast range of conduct in between."1"' Be-
cause other states have different laws and policies,"0 4 however, BMW
NA might not be punished at all, or not as severely, for the same mis-
conduct outside of Alabama.105 For example, BMW NA's conduct
would be lawful in the states that had implemented what the Court
The former United States Attorney General stated:
National standards are essential to correcting the flaws in the existing [civil
justice] system. A uniform federal law, deriving from the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution, should replace the patchwork quilt of sepa-
rate state laws. The operation of fifty laws in as many states is expensive and has
led only to confusion. Tort law is fundamentally interstate in character, and thus
the problem lends itself to a uniform national solution. On average, seventy per-
cent of the goods manufactured in one state are shipped out of state and sold
elsewhere. If the injury then occurs in a third state, the issue can become further
confused. Businesses and manufacturers need the certainty and uniformity pro-
vided by a federal policy.
A national law would not be contrary to the goal of systematically returning
authority to the states. Instead, it reflects the truly interstate and international
environment within which most competitive businesses operate today. A national
law would help businesses to level the playing field with their foreign
counterparts.
Id. at 1082 (footnotes omitted).
102. BMV, 116 S. Ct. at 1594-1604.
103. Id at 1605-06 (Breyer,J., concurring).
104. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (surveying various state statutes).
105. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595-97. The Court stated:
That diversity [of state laws and policies] demonstrates that reasonable people
may disagree about the value of a full disclosure requirement. Some legislatures
may conclude that affirmative disclosure requirements are unnecessary because
the self-interest of those involved in the automobile trade in developing and
maintaining the goodwill of their customers will motivate them to make voluntary
disclosures or to refrain from selling cars that do not comply with self-imposed
standards. Those legislatures that do adopt affirmative disclosure obligations may
take into account the cost of government regulation, choosing to draw a line
exempting minor repairs from such a requirement. In formulating a disclosure
standard, States may also consider other goals, such as providing a "safe harbor"
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viewed as "safe harbor" policies.1"6 In contrast with the treatment
BMW NA would have received in a safe-harbor state, the dramatic un-
equal treatment to which BMW NA has been subjected in Alabama
directly conflicts with the fundamental notions of fairness embraced
by due process law.10 7 By giving due process law priority over state
common law, the Court has empowered the states to reform their
practices so as to disallow unreasonably large deviations from the fed-
eral due process norm.
10 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, stated that the Court's holding in BMWwas an "unjustified
incursion into the province of state governments."10 9 Similarly, in a
separate dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Ginsburg criticized the BMWmajority for "unnecessarily and unwisely
ventur[ing] into territory traditionally within the States' domain." '
106. These policies are implemented to encourage out-of-state corporations to conduct
in-state business by providing them statutory protections. See, e.g., id. at 1600 (stating that
"a corporate executive could reasonably interpret the disclosure requirements as establish-
ing safe harbors").
107. Id. at 1595-1604.
108. Id, The BMWopinion will legitimize current reform efforts and provide an impe-
tus for additional reforms. Proposed statutory reforms include (1) capping the amount of
a punitive award or linking it to the award for compensatory damages, (2) requiring pay-
ment of a percentage of the award to the state, (3) increasing the burden of proof, and (4)
granting bifurcated trials. See id. app. at 1618-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing state
legislative activity regarding punitive damages); see also Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zol-
lers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A Proposed Alternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191, 195-203 (1994)
(analyzing the punitive-damages statutes in various states and proposing an alternative to
statutory reforms regarding punitive damages). As of this writing, at least one state legisla-
ture has eliminated common-law punitive damages altogether. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 507:16 (1997) (prohibiting imposition of punitive damages on tortfeasors unless explic-
itly provided by statute).
109. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Scalia pointed
out that the Court's holding lacked "precedential warrant for giving [the Court's] judg-
ment priority over the judgment of state courts and juries. . . ." Id. at 1611.
110. Id at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg pointed out that, although
the $2 million punitive-damages award might be unreasonable, the Alabama Supreme
Court had, in good faith, followed the "Court's prior instructions" and " ' thoroughly and
painstakingly' reviewed the jury's award." lI at 1614, 1616. Admittedly, the jury improp-
erly used the out-of-state sales as a multiplier for the compensatory damages to arrive at the
$4 million punitive award, but BMW NA's counsel failed to object to this method. I. at
1615-16. Further, because the Alabama Supreme Court had noted this computation prob-
lem and corrected it, the problem would not recur. Id Characterizing BMW as an "idio-
syncratic" case, Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court should not interfere with a state
court's decision when no major procedural flaws are noticed. Id. According to Justice
Ginsburg, the Court's involvement is impractical because
the Court will work at this business alone. It will not be aided by the federal
district courts and courts of appeals. It will be the only federal court policing the
area. The Court's readiness to superintend state court punitive damages awards
is all the more puzzling in view of the Court's longstanding reluctance to counte-
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This criticism is unsound. By its nature, the federal-state relation is a
two-way street. While in some instances the states' autonomy should
be respected, in other cases, as in BMW, federal intervention is appro-
priate.' Although the Court has observed that the states have legiti-
mate interests in furthering their dual objectives of punishment and
deterrence, the Court has also identified a "federal interest in prevent-
ing individual States from imposing undue burdens on interstate com-
merce."1 12  Large corporations, such as BMW NA, are "active
participant[s] in the national economy.""' A state's undue imposi-
tion of punitive damages on such corporations may have the practical
effect of regulating these corporations' out-of-state conduct, thus im-
peding interstate commerce. 1 4 Moreover, the Court should not ne-
glect its duty of enforcing constitutional protections in appropriate
nance review, even by courts of appeals, of the size of verdicts returned by juries
in federal district court proceedings.
Id. at 1617.
Justice Ginsburg's concern seems to be "premature." BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604 n.41.
The Court has reviewed very few punitive-damages cases in recent years, and BMW is the
first case "in decades" in which a punitive-damages award was found to exceed constitu-
tional limits. Id. Moreover, her concern does not justify the Court's shunning its "respon-
sibility" of enforcing constitutional protections in appropriate cases. Id.
111. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1596-98; see also id. at 1604-08 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604. The Court explained that while Congress "has ample
authority to enact" a nationwide policy regarding the disclosure of minor repairs to vehi-
cles, "it is clear that no single State could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on
neighboring states." Id at 1596-97. The Court stated further:
[O]ne State's power to impose burdens on the interstate market for automobiles
is not only subordinate to the federal power over interstate commerce, but is also
constrained by the need to respect the interests of other States. [T]he Constitu-
tion has a "special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic
union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with
the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres."
... [I]t follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a
State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of
changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States.
Id. at 1597 (citations omitted); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
113. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
114. Id. at 1596-98. Justice O'Connor has also observed that excessive punitive damages
have "a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products .... [These
products range from] prescription drugs ... [to] airplanes and motor vehicles ...."
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Ellis, supra note 101, at 975, 981-82
(observing that experts "had come to view the [punitive-damages] doctrine as a Franken-
stein's monster that required severe restraint" and stating that excessive and arbitrary puni-
tive damages have the effect of creating uncertainty, which leads to excessive deterrence
and overcompliance, and that the overall effect is a serious misallocation of resources);
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1143 (1996)
("Critics attribute to the present civil justice system various deleterious effects on the na-
tion's economy."). But see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive
Damages, 75 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 3, 9-17, 61-64 (1990) (presenting an empirical study sug-
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cases where due process concerns are implicated. In light of these
reasons, the Court has properly raised reasonableness in civil punish-
ment to the level of constitutional importance this standard deserves.
B. Development of a Coherent Framework for Scrutinizing
Punitive-Damages Awards
The BMW Court developed a coherent framework for determin-
ing whether a punitive award is within the constitutionally acceptable
range.' 15 This framework provides specific, practical guidance in two
ways. First, the framework limits a court's inquiry to a particular
state's interests.116 This "state interest" standard places constraints on
juries' and judges' discretion to award punitive damages that are un-
reasonably disproportionate to a state's legitimate interests. 1 7 This
standard is both logical and necessary because, for the federal system
to function properly, a state's discretion to award large punitive dam-
ages must be confined to cases in which the penalty both legitimately
furthers the state's interests and does not interfere with the other
states' policies. 18
Second, the BMWframework ensures that all tortfeasors, whether
they be individuals or corporations, receive adequate notice in accord-
ance with due process.119 The Court's "guideposts" are useful for de-
termining whether a defendant has received sufficient notice. The
first guidepost, the "degree of reprehensibility," 120 ensures that a
wrongdoer is assessed punitive damages that match the "enormity of
[the] offense." 1 ' As such, this guidepost prevents surprise, because
gesting that the punitive-damages problem is largely exaggerated and "highly politicized,"
and commenting that people should be "skeptical" of efforts to reform punitive damages).
115. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594-1604.
116. Id at 1594-98.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1596-97.
119. Id. One may attempt to distinguish between an individual and a corporation for
purposes of awarding punitive damages. The Court, however, has held that corporations
are also entitled to due process. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 413-14, 418-19 (1984) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
operates to limit the power of a State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
[corporate] defendant."); see also BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604 ("The fact that BMW [NA] is a
large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement
to fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on the conduct of its
business.").
120. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598-99. This guidepost is "[plerhaps the most important indi-
cium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award." Id. at 1599.
121. Id at 1599 (internal quotation marks omitted). In BMW, the Court reasoned that,
because the harm that BMW NA inflicted on Gore "was purely economic in nature" and
BMW NA's conduct was not "sufficiently reprehensible," a $2 million penalty was not ap-
propriate. Id at 1599, 1601; see also supra notes 77, 79, and 82 and accompanying text
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tortfeasors can expect that the punishment they receive will match the
degree of egregiousness of their misconduct. 12 2 Likewise, the second
guidepost, the ratio between the punitive award and the actual
harm,12 ' ensures that courts observe a reasonable proportionality be-
tween the actual harm inflicted by a tortfeasor and the corresponding
penalty.124 Finally, the third guidepost, comparing the punitive dam-
ages with the authorized civil or criminal sanctions, provides a suffi-
cient restraint on arbitrariness by compelling the lower courts to
assess punitive damages within the bounds of reason. 12 5
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, with whom Justice
Thomas joined, asserted that the "'guideposts' mark the road to no-
where; they provide no real guidance at all.' 1 26 This criticism lacks
merit. True, the guideposts are not black-and-white. However, as the
Court has repeatedly emphasized, due process is not amenable to any
simple "mathematical formula."127 Even if a specific "formula" for as-
sessing punitive damages could be established, it would be unwise to
do so, because unpredictability is an essential ingredient of the deter-
rence derived from punitive damages.'28 The fundamental purpose
of punitive damages would be destroyed if that important ingredient
were removed. Finally, Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion
joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, keenly observed that "[1] egal
standards need not be precise in order to satisfy ... constitutional
(explaining why BMW NA's conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify a multimillion-
dollar punitive award).
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
123. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1601. This guidepost is "perhaps [the] most commonly cited
indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award...." Id,
124. Id, at 1602-03.
125. Id at 1603-04.
126. Id. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1612-14 (asserting that "degree of
reprehensibility," "trickery and deceit," "state interest analysis," and "reasonableness" are
vague standards).
127. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
128. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, No. 1920324, 1997 WL 233910, at *7 (Ala.
May 9, 1997) (per curiam) (refusing to establish a ratio of punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages "that would apply to all and would therefore give a wrongdoer precise notice
of the penalty that his conduct might incur [because doing] so would frustrate the purpose
of punitive damages, which is to punish and deter a defendant's misconduct"). Id. The
Alabama court preferred to go on a "case-by-case" basis, even though it might be "difficult"
to do so. Id at *7, *9; see also Hurd & Zollers, supra note 108, at 203 (suggesting that, in
reforming punitive-damage law, states should not set any specific ratio, because "[a] n es-
sential element of the deterrent function is the unpredictability of the risk[, and] [i]f a
business cannot determine ex ante the cost of engaging in misconduct, it cannot use a cost/
benefit analysis to decide whether it will be profitable to so act").
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concern." '29 The BMWguideposts for assessing punitive damages are
similar to such legal standards as "reasonable care," "due diligence,"
and "best interests of the child."' 0 Just as these broad standards have
sufficiently guided the courts, so too will the guideposts. 131
V. CONCLUSION
The Court, by elevating reasonableness in punitive damages to a
principle of substantive due process, has sent a clear message that the
sky is no longer the limit on punitive damages. Instead, due process
imposes a substantive limit, protecting all wrongdoers from arbitrary
punishment.1 32 Moreover, the Court's guideposts provide a practical
framework for scrutinizing punitive damages. Being mindful of the
state-federal dichotomy, the Court has developed necessarily flexible
yet substantive guidelines which will empower the states to experi-
ment with various approaches within constitutional bounds.'33 In do-
ing so, the Court has moved closer to restraining punitive damages
that have "run wild." 1'
SON B. NGUYEN
129. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer pointed out that
punitive-damages standards are adequate so long as they provide "some kind of constraint
upon a jury or court's discretion, and thus protection against purely arbitrary behavior."
Id. Absent any constraint, the risk of arbitrary and biased jury verdicts would be height-
ened. Id.
130. Id.; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991).
131. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605 (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
133. Id at 1594-1604; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
134. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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